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Studies of ethnicity have lacked scientific and 
political legitimacy for decades in France, but 
French urban sociology is increasingly con-
cerned with this issue.1 During the 2005 riots, 
black and Arab youth in the French suburbs 
were primarily depicted in violent images. 
The media and some politicians linked the 
riots to immigrants’ failed assimilation and 
the rise of communitarianism in France. At 
the same time, scholars are increasingly using 
ghettoization terminology, usually regarded 
as specific to the U.S. context, to describe 
French urban dynamics. This debate has 
lacked evidence regarding the extent to which 
neighborhood ethnic characteristics are driv-
ing geographic mobility.
We seek to describe natives’ and immi-
grants’2 geographic mobility in France, as 
well as how these groups react to neighbor-
hoods’ ethnic compositions. We build on U.S. 
literature concerning the effect of ethnic pref-
erences on mobility for whites and minorities 
and discuss its relevance for France. Our 
empirical analyses rely on unique data that 
combine longitudinal individual information 
on geographic mobility with contextual 
aggregated socioeconomic and ethnic charac-
teristics of residential areas. This panel data 
structure allows us to control for effects of 
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Abstract
This article provides empirical results on patterns of native and immigrant geographic mobility 
in France. Using longitudinal data, we measure mobility from one French municipality 
(commune) to another over time and estimate the effect of the initial municipality’s ethnic 
composition on the probability of moving out. These data allow us to use panel techniques to 
correct for biases related to selection based on geographic and individual unobservables. Our 
findings tend to discredit the hypothesis of a “white flight” pattern in residential mobility 
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individual and geographic unobserved char-
acteristics on mobility, thus enhancing confi-
dence in our estimates. Findings show very 
little support for “French white flight” in out-
migration but some support for avoidance 
patterns in relocating. On the other hand, we 
find the ethnic clustering pattern to be highly 
robust.
IN SEARCh oF WhItE FLIGht
Classical sociologists depict geographic 
mobility as the channel through which ethnic 
segregation can lose ground (Duncan and 
Lieberson 1959; Park and Burgess 1921). 
Geographic mobility is thus seen as a sign—
or an outcome—of the assimilation process 
(Massey and Denton 1985; South, Crowder, 
and Chavez 2005). Studies on patterns and 
trends of segregation in the United States 
emphasize the limitations of this framework, 
especially for African Americans (Iceland and 
Scopilliti 2008; Massey and Denton 1993). 
The very slow decrease in racial segregation 
after the Civil Rights Act shifted focus to the 
white population’s behavior. Much work sup-
ports the idea that, after Jim Crow and with 
the upheaval of anti-discrimination laws, seg-
regation has been sustained by whites’ unwill-
ingness to remain in neighborhoods with 
large and growing ethnic minority popula-
tions. Scholars have documented white flight 
over more than three decades in the United 
States (Farley et al. 1978; Galster 1990; 
Massey, Gross, and Shibuya 1994; South and 
Crowder 1998). Some studies have also 
attempted to directly measure natives’ out-
migration as a response to minority influx in 
their residential areas (Boustan 2010; Card 
and DiNardo 2000; Frey 1995; Kritz and 
Gurak 2001; White and Liang 1998). In these 
studies, scholars have attempted to account 
for the possibility that whites’ out-migration 
may not be motivated by the presence of eth-
nic minorities (or their growing number) per 
se, but rather by the poor socioeconomic 
conditions (e.g., employment opportunities, 
safety conditions, and social interactions) of 
the neighborhoods in which minorities are (or 
become) overrepresented (Frey 1979).3 For 
example, research shows that school choice is 
a significant component of whites’ decisions 
to out-migrate (Fairlie and Resch 2002; 
Renzulli and Evans 2005).
U.S. scholars typically assume that empiri-
cal findings supporting white flight demon-
strate the persistence of racial prejudice 
among whites (Farley et al. 1994; Yinger 
1976). Studies on subjective preferences 
toward neighborhood ethnic and racial com-
position tend to show patterns consistent with 
this hypothesis (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; 
Charles 2003). However, none of these stud-
ies were conducted on white movers, nor 
asked them to what extent the ethnic compo-
sition of their initial neighborhoods prompted 
them to move. Krysan’s (2002) study is one 
of the rare investigations of the motivations 
of whites who said they would leave inte-
grated neighborhoods; it provides some evi-
dence of negative racial stereotypes.
The only quantitative findings on French 
attitudes toward minority populations show 
high prejudice toward post-colonial migration 
and specifically North Africans (Girard 1971; 
Lamy, Charbit, and Girard 1974). More 
recently, comparative studies document 
increasing anti-immigrant attitudes in Euro-
pean countries, including France (Malchow-
Møller et al. 2009; Quillian 1995; Semyonov, 
Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). High pro-
portions of right-wing extremism since the 
1980s also point toward the prominence of 
ethnoracial prejudice (Mayer 2002). Finally, 
the Commission Nationale Consultative des 
Droits de l’Homme regularly publishes opin-
ion survey results on racism and prejudice in 
French society.
None of these studies document prefer-
ences in terms of neighborhood ethnic com-
position. Using the European Social Survey 
(ESS), one of the rare datasets containing 
information on neighborhood preferences, 
Semyonov, Glikman, and Krysan (2007) 
show that the French, and more generally 
Europeans, tend to live in ethnically homoge-
neous neighborhoods and overwhelmingly 
report they wish to reside in areas without 
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ethnic minorities. The authors also show that 
in addition to socioeconomic predictors of 
these preferences, racial prejudice measured 
by a set of social psychological variables 
holds consistent explanatory power. They 
thus conclude that whites’ patterns of avoid-
ance of ethnic minorities are similar in Europe 
and the United States. Preferences in terms of 
ethnoracial neighborhood composition may 
thus shape French natives’ residential strate-
gies and would lead us to expect avoidance 
dynamics resembling white flight patterns in 
the United States. In particular, some research 
suggests the educational dimension of anti-
immigrant flight is substantial in France spe-
cifically because school choice is often 
limited to the location of residence and the 
presence of immigrants’ children in class-
rooms is usually associated with lower qual-
ity education (Oberti 2007; van Zanten 2001). 
Other research shows a high correlation 
between neighborhood ethnic composition 
and perceptions of safety in European coun-
tries; sense of safety is lowest among Europe-
ans residing in neighborhoods populated 
mostly by ethnic minorities (Semyonov, 
Gorodzeisky, and Glikman 2012). These find-
ings suggest anti-immigrant flight might also 
be driven by fear of crime due to stereotypes 
associating immigration with insecurity.
On the other hand, even if stereotypes and 
prejudice about minority populations are 
widespread and affect neighborhood prefer-
ences, this does not necessarily mean that 
white flight patterns would be observed in 
France. According to Schelling (1969), indi-
vidual preferences are only activated once a 
threshold is reached. This idea has led schol-
ars to attempt to measure the tipping point of 
whites’ tolerance toward their black neigh-
bors (Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008; Clark 
1991). The literature highlights that these 
tipping points are related to urban and popu-
lation structures that may differ across coun-
tries and even within cities in a given country. 
Such factors as population size, proportion of 
each minority group, total minority popula-
tion size, and level of spatial segregation can 
affect the point at which local tipping points 
are reached. Many urban geographers 
and sociologists argue that for historical and 
geographic reasons, the configuration of cit-
ies is different in Europe and the United 
States (Peach 1996, 1999; Wacquant 1992).
The dominant discourse about the lower 
level of ethnic and racial segregation in 
France compared to the United States builds 
on a general acceptance that U.S. society gen-
erates more social inequality due to lower 
redistribution (Brandolini and Smeeding 
2006). The latest French research suggests 
that income segregation is also lower in 
France than in the United States (Guyon 
2012). Some evidence, however, shows more 
intense education inequality in France meas-
ured in terms of effects of social and immi-
grant backgrounds on education outcomes 
(OECD 2010).
The presumably lower level of ethnic and 
racial segregation in France is also linked to a 
prevailing belief that, compared to the U.S. 
context, ethnicity and race are less prominent 
stratification factors. Due to limitations in 
data availability, studies have only recently 
provided information regarding the magni-
tude of ethnic segregation in France (Pan Ké 
Shon 2009; Préteceille 2009; Rathelot 2012; 
Safi 2009; Verdugo 2011). For example, Safi 
(2009) computed dissimilarity indices for the 
eight largest French cities using five subse-
quent censuses (from 1968 to 1999). In 1999, 
these indices ranged from .09 (in Nice) to .31 
(in Strasbourg) when computed for the whole 
immigrant population, and they have 
increased over time for some specific groups, 
approaching .5 for Turks and sub-Saharan 
Africans in some cities. Along with other 
studies reporting similar findings, this 
research tends to confirm that segregation is 
less salient in France compared to the United 
States, where black-white segregation indices 
average around .65 and reach .85 in some 
metropolitan areas.4 This lower level of seg-
regation suggests that neighborhood ethnic 
composition preferences may have less of an 
effect on geographic mobility dynamics in 
France, not necessarily because these prefer-
ences are less prominent, but rather because 
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segregation is globally less intense and local 
tipping points are rarely reached.
We rely considerably on theoretical and 
empirical frameworks from U.S. research, but 
the terminology must be modified when trans-
posed to the French case. It is not strictly cor-
rect to speak of white flight when using French 
data, because some ethnic minority populations 
are natives and cannot be distinguished from 
“non-ethnic French” in the census. Rather, 
what we measure in this study is more accu-
rately called “native flight.” We occasionally 
use the expression “French white flight” for the 
sake of comparability with the U.S. case.
EthNIC CLuStERING
We use the expression “ethnic clustering” to 
refer to ethnic minority concentration result-
ing from complex processes that may be 
linked to these populations’ residential strate-
gies and to structural constraining mecha-
nisms. By ethnic clustering, we are not 
implying any particular segregation pattern 
(Massey and Denton 1988) but simply 
increasing proportions of minority popula-
tions in some locations.
In the United States, the white flight 
framework’s underlying assumption holds 
that blacks and ethnic minorities also prefer 
white or integrated neighborhoods. Contest-
ing this assumption, research shows that in-
group preferences are widespread for both 
majority and minority populations (Bobo and 
Zubrinsky 1996; Krysan and Farley 2002; 
Pais, South, and Crowder 2009; Vigdor 2003). 
However, such preferences are still much 
stronger among whites than among blacks 
and ethnic minorities in the United States.
Most empirical studies find that blacks and 
immigrants are reluctant to leave areas where 
persons of their own group are concentrated 
(Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi 2002; Zavodny 1999). 
Moreover, some research draws attention to 
the fact that ethnic groups may even seek self-
segregation because it can bring about eco-
nomic and social advantages (Aldrich and 
Waldinger 1990; Borjas 1992; Logan, Alba, 
and Zhang 2002; Munshi 2003; Portes 1998; 
Zhou 1992).
To date, there has been little research on 
minority neighborhood preferences in France. 
Urban studies, however, are increasingly doc-
umenting the concentration of immigrants in 
certain areas. Glikman and Semyonov (2012) 
studied immigrants’ perceptions of their 
neighborhoods’ ethnic and racial composition 
comparing 13 countries. They found that 
first- and second-generation immigrants in 
Europe tend to live in neighborhoods where 
ethnic and racial minorities are concentrated. 
Preferences for ethnic neighborhoods partly 
explain this geographic concentration, but the 
authors also show that perceived discrimina-
tion is positively correlated to Africans’ 
and Muslims’ probability to live in ethnic 
neighborhoods.
Discrimination is indeed a major structural 
mechanism challenging the validity of ethnic 
minorities’ self-segregation (Dawkins 2004; 
Galster 1988). A considerable number of 
studies in the United States document the 
continuing prevalence of ethnic and racial 
housing discrimination, mostly relying on 
audit studies (Fix and Struyk 1993; Galster 
1992). Direct and indirect discrimination 
impedes ethnic minorities from locating or 
relocating in some areas and thus may have 
crucial effects on their geographic mobility.
Similar mechanisms may be preventing 
ethnic minorities in France from desegregating 
through geographic mobility. Although studies 
on housing discrimination in France are still 
rare, some recent findings on the extent of the 
phenomenon are quite alarming (Bonnet et al. 
2011). According to a study by the Haute 
Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et 
pour l’Egalité (2006), ethnic minorities 
(namely African) are only 25 percent as likely 
as their paired non-ethnic French to be selected 
to rent an apartment. Some measures of 
reported discrimination in access to housing 
also indicate high levels of ethnoracial dis-
crimination (Safi and Simon forthcoming).
Increasing housing inequality brings about 
additional constraints on geographic mobility 
that may structurally disadvantage ethnic 
minority populations, specifically because they 
cannot rely on inherited resources. Barriers to 
securing affordable housing severely hinder 
 
Rathelot and Safi 47
ethnic minorities’ access to homeownership, 
leading to increasing wealth inequality (Krivo 
and Kaufman 2004; Oliver and Shapiro 1995).
In France, recent research reveals intensi-
fying wealth inequality and the growing role 
that household income flows play in a context 
where real estate prices have steadily increased 
in almost every major French city (Gallot, 
Leprévost, and Rougerie 2011). Although 
there is still no research regarding the effect of 
these dynamics on ethnic inequality, it is plau-
sible that they have sharpened ethnic housing 
disadvantages at the individual level and 
intensified economic disparities between 
immigrant and native neighborhoods.
These studies show that interpreting the 
concentration of minority populations as a 
conscious ethnic locational strategy under-
states the fact that structural economic and 
institutional factors, as well as direct and 
indirect mechanisms of housing discrimina-
tion, may also lead to a form of imposed 
segregation. The aim of this article is to 
investigate causal links between local ethnic 
composition and immigrants’ and natives’ 
geographic mobility in France. Our review of 
the literature highlights two hypotheses. First, 
the high level of hostility to immigration, 
combined with an increase in ethnic segrega-
tion and the growing relevance of ethnora-
cially motivated locational decisions, leads us 
to expect French white flight.
Hypothesis 1: Natives’ out-mobility increases 
with the local share of immigrants.
On the other hand, preferences for co-ethnic 
neighbors, housing discrimination, and struc-
tural factors in the housing market suggest a 
possible statistical association between immi-
grants’ residential mobility and their neigh-
borhoods’ ethnic composition.
Hypothesis 2: Immigrants’ out-mobility decreases 
with the local share of their co-ethnics.
A considerable body of French urban research 
would contest these hypotheses, arguing that 
levels of segregation are low in France and 
that ethnicity and race are less potent factors 
in the French social stratification structure 
than in the United States. This article pro-
vides an empirical test of these hypotheses.
DAtA
Our data were extracted from a large French 
longitudinal database called Echantillon 
Démographique Permanent (EDP). The EDP 
was created by the French National Institute of 
Statistics (INSEE) in 1967 as a longitudinal 
dataset to link successive censuses as well as 
various events reported in registration data (e.g., 
births, deaths, and marriages). The EDP cur-
rently contains data from the 1968, 1975, 1982, 
1990, and 1999 population censuses. The EDP 
is constructed through simple individual sam-
pling: it includes individuals born on certain 
days of the year (4 out of 365 days, around 1 
percent of the population) and for whom a cen-
sus form or civil status certificate issued upon a 
major demographic event in the individual’s life 
(e.g., birth, marriage, death, or childbirth) is 
available. Whenever individuals enter the panel, 
they may be tracked across the following cen-
suses if they are listed again. Sampling is thus 
the same for immigrants and for natives; they 
appear in the EDP as soon as they are identified, 
or as soon as one of their civil status certificates 
is collected.5 The EDP is a valuable dataset for 
studying immigration because it allows 
researchers to deal with significant samples of 
immigrants and to compare the situations of 
several groups that are often underrepresented 
in other surveys. Although the EDP does not 
focus on ethnicity-related issues, many studies 
show it is one of the most valuable empirical 
sources for analyzing geographic mobility in 
France (Détang-Dessendre, Goffette-Nagot, and 
Piguet 2008).
We analyze geographic mobility during two 
inter-census periods (1982 to 1990 and 1990 to 
1999). Our sample includes only individuals 
who are listed in two successive censuses 
between 1982 and 1999 and for whom infor-
mation about the municipality of residence 
(i.e., commune) is available.6 If one’s resi-
dence is different in t + 1 from the one 
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declared in t, we assume geographic mobility. 
Conversely, individuals who declared the same 
municipality of residence in t and t + 1 are 
defined as sedentary. This broad definition of 
mobility does not take the distance of a move 
into account. The U.S. literature typically uses 
the expression “residential mobility” to refer to 
short distance moves (within a metropolitan 
area) (Alba et al. 1999). Given our different 
definition, we prefer to speak more generally 
of “geographic mobility,” by which we mean 
any movement out of a municipality. In the 
findings section we test for alternative defini-
tions of geographic mobility.
We enriched EDP data with local indicators 
extracted from the General Population Census 
in 1982 and 1990. We used the census to com-
pute for each municipality the main covariates 
of interest: proportions of the most sizeable 
minority groups (Algerians, Moroccans, Portu-
guese, Italians, and Spanish). We then matched 
these proportions with EDP data to build the 
proportion of co-ethnics in a municipality of 
residence. We also used census data to build 
contextual variables at the municipality level, 
which are mainly used to control for a munici-
pality’s social and economic situation, such as 
population size, unemployment rate, propor-
tion of managers, proportion of subsidized 
housing tenants, and proportion of school 
dropouts. For an individual i and a period of 
observation between t and t + 1, these varia-
bles provide information about municipality 
characteristics at time t. Our data thus offer a 
unique opportunity to measure effects of indi-
vidual- and contextual-level characteristics on 
EDP respondents’ geographic mobility.
One could criticize the geographic level at 
which these variables are measured. French 
municipalities are larger than U.S. census 
tracts and are hardly equivalent to local neigh-
borhoods. French communes are an interme-
diary scale between U.S. census tracts and 
U.S. counties (Courgeau 1982), but, unfortu-
nately, EDP longitudinal data cannot identify 
individuals’ locations at a smaller geographic 
level.7
Nevertheless, use of the municipality level 
is relevant to analysis of contextual effects on 
geographic mobility for several reasons. 
Municipalities are the smallest political enti-
ties; local housing policy guidelines (espe-
cially in terms of public housing construction), 
provision of important local amenities (e.g., 
elementary schools and security), and some 
taxes (business taxes and property taxes) are 
defined at this level. Rhein (1998:431) argues 
that the commune level is relevant for “evalu-
ating the differential impacts of housing and 
urban policies upon social structure at the 
national as well as at the municipal level.” 
Even though some studies show that within-
commune heterogeneity has increased in 
recent years, this heterogeneity is still on a 
smaller scale than in the United States. A few 
studies have compared measures of segrega-
tion using the IRIS and commune divisions in 
the 1999 census and found similar patterns of 
ethnic segregation (Verdugo 2011).
Figures 1 and 2 provide maps of French 
municipalities in the Parisian metropolitan 
area (Ile-de-France), which stretches roughly 
150km east to west and 100km north to south 
(around 12,000 sq. km. or 4,600 sq. mi.). This 
area comprises approximately 1,600 com-
munes. Other large metropolitan areas in 
France usually include hundreds of com-
munes. Figure 1 reports municipalities’ popu-
lation density (total population/total area), 
and Figure 2 shows the share of immigrants 
within municipalities. Both maps are based 
on 1990 census data. Communes are very 
diverse with regard to density and immigrant 
populations. The center of Paris is very dense, 
but overall population density decreases pro-
gressively as distance from the center 
increases. The local share of immigrants in 
the total population does not reflect the same 
spatial correlation. Indeed, the distribution in 
Figure 2 underlines immigrant populations’ 
historical concentration in the northeast of 
Paris, the ex-industrial red belt (i.e., munici-
palities with a high proportion of working 
class, who tended to vote for the French Com-
munist Party in the 1950s).
Table 1 displays summary statistics on 
French communes in which at least one EDP 
individual resided in 1990 (28,795 out of a 
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total of 36,568 communes). The first three 
columns show distribution of the population 
across communes, average share of immi-
grants, and average mobility rate for all com-
munes, as well as averages for subsamples of 
communes according to their size. The first 
striking fact is that most French communes 
are very small, with 90 percent counting fewer 
than 3,000 inhabitants. Communes with more 
than 10,000 inhabitants are relatively rare: 854 
out of 28,795 (about 3 percent). Second, 
immigrants’ share is positively correlated with 
commune size: the proportion of immigrants 
is more than three times higher in communes 
of more than 10,000 inhabitants compared to 
communes of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. 
The mobility rate also tends to be higher in 
larger communes, but not by a large extent. 
The last three columns represent individuals 
in our sample. Among the 322,759 individuals 
in our sample for 1990, 53 percent lived in 
communes of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, 
and 47 percent resided in the top 3 percent of 
communes in terms of population size.
Our sample contains 569,569 native and 
41,917 immigrant observations. Natives and 
immigrants differ mainly in terms of individ-
ual characteristics (see Table S1 in the online 
supplement [http://asr.sagepub.com/supple-
mental]). The most prominent disparities can 
be observed in education level (with a large 
proportion of immigrants reporting no educa-
tion) and occupation (with a large proportion 
of blue-collar immigrants). The average char-
acteristics of municipalities where immi-
grants lived do not differ consistently from 
natives’ municipalities. The most noticeable 
disparities concern the total proportion of 
Legend
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Figure 1. Population Density in Ile-de-France Communes in 1990 (inhabitants per km2)
Source: French census (INSEE) 1990.
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table 1. Description of French Communes in 1990
Unit: Commune Unit: Individual
 
All  
Sizes
Less than 
10,000 inh.
More than 
10,000 inh.
All  
Sizes
Less than 
10,000 inh.
More than 
10,000 inh.
Number 28,795 27,941 854 322,759 170,818 151,941
Population  
 Mean 1,918 985 32,452 35,885 2,822 73,056
 P10 144 144 11,092 550 332 13,912
 P25 252 248 13,516 1,693 720 21,669
 P50 512 489 19,957 8,160 1,860 42,744
 P75 1,144 1,044 35,342 40,221 4,316 99,281
 P90 2,998 2,356 60,616 123,552 7,090 187,632
Share of Immigrants  
 Mean .042 .039 .125 .090 .053 .130
Mobility Rate  
 Mean .266 .263 .352 .318 .275 .366
Note: P10 = the 10th percentile, P25 = 25th percentile, etc.
Legend
<0.5%
<2%
<5%
<10%
<15%
>15%
Figure 2. Proportion of Immigrants in Ile-de-France Communes in 1990
Source: French census (INSEE) 1990.
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immigrants, which is significantly higher in 
immigrants’ municipalities compared to 
natives’ municipalities (see Table S2 in the 
online supplement).
MEthoDoLoGICAL ISSuES
Much sociological literature is concerned 
with misattribution of contextual effects 
(Hauser 1974; Robinson 1950; Sampson, 
Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002). The 
most frequent concerns are related to selec-
tion into geographic locations, measurement 
error, and cluster autocorrelation. We now 
turn to these three issues.
Isolating the Causal Effect of Local 
Ethnic Composition
A frequent concern regarding the use of 
aggregated contextual variables is related to 
nonrandom sorting into geographic units. 
This selection may lead to considerable esti-
mation biases, among which we distinguish 
two sources.
The first source of bias is related to geo-
graphic unobservable characteristics. Despite 
the introduction of several social and demo-
graphic covariates to describe locations, some 
unobserved determinants may still affect 
mobility. When these determinants are corre-
lated with the proportion of immigrants, esti-
mation of our parameters of interest will be 
biased. Some areas are undesirable due to 
“pure” geographic features, such as weather, 
proximity to natural resources or amenities, 
and transportation connectivity. If, for histori-
cal reasons, immigrants tend to live in the 
least desirable geographic areas, this lack of 
desirability may continue to cause people to 
avoid these areas independent of the current 
local ethnic composition.
A second potential source of bias is indi-
vidual unobserved heterogeneity. Ethnic 
composition of a municipality at time t is a 
consequence of prior residential decisions 
and is probably affected by variables similar 
to the ones underlying the probability to 
move (Halaby 2004). In our case, individual 
preferences with regard to a municipality’s 
ethnic composition may affect both the choice 
of location in t and mobility between t and t + 
1. The same hypothesis can be put forward 
concerning individual strategies driven by 
social attainment motivations. If individuals 
seek better schools for their children, this 
affects both their choice of location in t and 
their mobility pattern between t and t + 1. 
Selection into the initial location may thus 
upwardly bias the effect of local ethnic com-
position on the probability of geographic 
mobility.8
Nearly all communes and 63 percent of 
individuals were observed during both peri-
ods: these features allow us to control for 
both geographic unobserved heterogeneity at 
the commune level and individual heteroge-
neity. We use panel models to control for 
geographic and individual effects. The most 
general version of the model we estimate is 
the following:
where i is the individual, g is individual i’s 
ethnic group, t is the time period (1982 to 
1990 or 1990 to 1999), and l is the location 
where individual i lived at the beginning of 
time period t. The binary outcome Y is equal 
to one if the individual moved during the 
period. A latent Y* is assumed to exist and to 
depend linearly on the covariates. The covari-
ates of most interest in this study are c, the 
proportion of co-ethnics in the municipality, 
and m, the total share of immigrants in the 
municipality. We include other covariates to 
control for observable and unobservable het-
erogeneity: Z represents local contextual vari-
ables; X individual variables; and μ individual, 
time, and geographic effects. γ and δ are 
indexed by g, as we interact most of the indi-
vidual and contextual covariates with the 
dummy variable of “being an immigrant.”
In the remainder of the text we use some 
expressions that may imply a causal denota-
tion (e.g., “white flight effect” or “clustering 
effect”), but our data and methods cannot rule 
Y c m Z X uiglt glt lt lt g it g i l t iglt
* = + + + + + + +α β γ δ µ µ µ
Y Yiglt iglt= >
* 0
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out alternative assumptions about underlying 
mechanisms and consequently do not lend 
themselves to strictly causal inference.
Measurement Error
There are three reasons why measurement 
error may be an issue in our study. First, the 
main covariates of interest are proportions of 
immigrants, and some municipalities may 
have few immigrants. Second, we computed 
these proportions using a one-fourth extract 
of the censuses, because detailed information 
on immigrants’ country of origin is not avail-
able on an exhaustive basis. Finally, French 
municipalities are rather small (more than 
20,000 of the 36,600 municipalities have 
fewer than 500 inhabitants). Because of these 
three factors, immigrants’ proportions in 
municipalities are not measured accurately; 
the error will be higher for smaller munici-
palities and those with few immigrants. 
Measurement errors generate a systematic 
bias of coefficients corresponding to propor-
tions of immigrants (Mairesse and Greenan 
1999). To reduce this bias, we introduce inter-
action terms for the variables of interest (pro-
portion of immigrants and proportion of 
co-ethnics in the municipality) with the size 
of the municipality, distinguishing their effect 
in small versus large (more than 10,000 
inhabitants) municipalities. Small municipali-
ties’ coefficients are likely to be biased down-
ward, but their sign can still be informative. 
Only coefficients related to large municipali-
ties might be expected to be unbiased.
Autocorrelation within Units
Estimating effects of aggregate variables on 
micro-units may lead to severely biased 
results. Moulton (1990) stresses that, when a 
multi-level analysis is carried out, one must 
account for the cluster structure of the variance-
covariance. Omitting the relevant cluster 
structure will likely lead to downward-biased 
standard errors for the coefficient relating to 
contextual covariates: estimates will too often 
appear significantly different from zero when 
they are not. This issue is dealt with by relax-
ing the assumption that the error terms of 
two observations belonging to the same 
municipality are not correlated. Adjusting the 
variance-covariance matrix to account for this 
cluster structure is enough to recover unbi-
ased inference.
FINDINGS
A binary logit model shows a significant 
effect of local proportions of immigrants for 
both natives and immigrants (see Table 2). 
Natives and immigrants tend to move more 
often out of areas with higher immigrant con-
centrations. For immigrants, however, mobil-
ity is also affected by co-ethnic concentration: 
the higher the proportion of immigrants of the 
same group in the municipality, the lower the 
probability of immigrants moving out. All in 
all, individual and contextual9 control vari-
ables have similar associations for natives’ 
and immigrants’ residential mobility. The 
only noticeable difference is related to the 
proportion of subsidized housing, which has a 
significant positive effect only for natives’ 
residential mobility.
We now take advantage of the panel struc-
ture of our dataset. Table 3 displays results of 
three different models. Model 1, which intro-
duces geographic fixed effects at the commune 
level, is our preferred model. Model 2 is a 
variation of Model 1 relaxing the assumption 
that communes’ fixed effects are equal for 
natives and immigrants. One might suspect 
that unobserved geographic heterogeneity may 
be at play differently for immigrants and for 
natives. Weather or school quality may be 
more determinant factors for natives, whereas 
concentrations of public housing and levels of 
discrimination within localities may have a 
more decisive effect on immigrants’ mobility. 
Moreover, specifying identical geographic 
effects for immigrants and natives does not 
reflect the fact that municipalities may actually 
differ in how they treat immigrants (e.g., space 
dedicated to immigrants in subsidized housing 
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table 2. Logit Models of Geographic Mobility for Natives and Immigrants
Natives Immigrants
 Odds Ratios SE Odds Ratios SE
Education/No Education  
 Primary school certificate 1.058*** .012 1.018 .040
 Lower secondary school diploma 1.237*** .017 1.143* .068
 Vocational high school 1.191*** .013 1.151*** .046
 High school 1.582*** .023 1.345*** .076
 College 1.653*** .026 1.551*** .088
Occupation/Blue Collara  
 Farmer .449*** .012 .835 .126
 Craftsman or retail trader 1.472*** .025 1.346*** .085
 Manager 1.495*** .027 1.396*** .104
 Intermediate professions 1.379*** .018 1.402*** .080
 Office worker 1.252*** .015 1.184*** .052
 Unemployed (has never worked) .723*** .030 1.185 .140
 Non-working (has never worked) .928* .034 .994 .097
 Currently unemployed 1.145*** .019 1.075 .049
 Currently non-working 1.332*** .050 1.057 .105
 Still studying 1.482*** .026 1.035 .073
Family Situation/Single without Children  
 Single with children .969 .017 1.011 .073
 Married without children 1.117*** .017 1.028 .051
 Married with one or two children .707*** .011 .734*** .033
 Married with more than two children .729*** .016 .600*** .036
 Divorced or widowed without children 1.386*** .027 1.283** .101
 Divorced or widowed with children 1.152*** .024 .957 .080
 Undeclared without children 1.127** .047 1.105 .143
 Undeclared with children .858** .046 .596*** .089
Immigrant Origin/Algeria  
 Western Europe 1.118 .071
 Eastern Europe .924 .064
 Spain 1.016 .058
 Italy .913 .051
 Portugal 1.018 .050
 Sub-Saharan Africa 1.904*** .116
 Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam 1.665*** .115
 Morocco .822* .063
 Tunisia .851* .061
 Turkey 1.030 .084
Other Individual Characteristics  
 Women .903*** .008 .848*** .028
 Age at t .861*** .002 .912*** .007
 Age square at t 1.001*** .000 1.001*** .000
 Between 1990 and 1999 1.353*** .016 .906* .035
 Homeownership in t .465*** .004 .583*** .089
Contextual Characteristics at the Municipality Level 
 Unemployment rate 1.006 .006 1.028 .021
 Share of managers 1.177*** .012 1.182*** .024
 Share of subsidized housing 1.103*** .013 .995 .020
(continued)
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or landlords’ tolerance toward immigrants) 
(Garbaye 2005; Light 2006). In Model 2, we 
thus allow for geographic heterogeneity to 
vary for natives and immigrants. This amounts 
to estimating twice as many communes’ fixed 
effects; we only apply it for large communes.
Models 1 and 2 introduce only geographic 
heterogeneity, yet our data lend themselves to 
the additional control for individual heteroge-
neity. In Model 3, we account for both types 
of heterogeneity. Because the number of com-
munes is large and we only have two periods 
of observation, performing this estimation 
requires restricting the number of geographic 
fixed effects. We therefore estimate Model 3 
only for large communes. Individual effects 
here are designed as random,10 whereas geo-
graphic effects are fixed.
We introduce a full set of individual and 
contextual control variables in these models 
(the same ones as in Table 2), but Table 3 
reports only coefficients of the variables of 
interest (share of immigrants for natives and 
immigrants, and share of co-ethnics for immi-
grants). We focus on findings for large com-
munes because they are less sensitive to 
measurement error bias.
First, it is remarkable that the statistical 
association between the share of co-ethnics 
and immigrants’ mobility is strongly robust 
across three models. Immigrants are consid-
erably less likely to move from communes 
where their co-ethnics are numerous. The 
effect is significant at .1 percent and is large 
in magnitude. In communes of more than 
10,000 inhabitants, increasing the proportion 
of co-ethnics by one standard deviation will 
decrease the probability to move by 5.7 per-
centage points (21 percent), which should be 
compared to the average mobility rate of 
immigrants from large communes, equal to 
28 percent (calculations based on Model 1).
Second, the native flight effect is only sig-
nificant in the simple logit model (Table 2) or 
in models where only individual heterogene-
ity is controlled (see Table S3 in the online 
supplement), but not when geographic fixed 
effects are introduced. In Table 3, the local 
share of immigrants has no significant effect 
on either immigrants’ or natives’ geographic 
mobility. Allowing geographic effects to dif-
fer between natives and immigrants (Model 
2) does not alter the coefficients. Findings are 
also very similar when both individual and 
geographic heterogeneities are controlled for 
(Model 3), with an even stronger co-ethnics 
effect. These results suggest that controlling 
for local unobserved characteristics is crucial 
Natives Immigrants
 Odds Ratios SE Odds Ratios SE
 Share of dropouts .969*** .007 1.042 .026
 Log of total population .870*** .014 .775*** .026
For Municipalities > 10,000 Inhabitants  
 Share of immigrants 1.127*** .015 1.162*** .030
 Share of co-ethnics (for immigrants) .812*** .022
For Municipalities < 10,000 Inhabitants  
 Share of immigrants 1.032*** .009 .996 .026
 Share of co-ethnics (for immigrants) .896*** .020
N 569,569 41,917
Pseudo R-sq .17 .12
aWe use categories from the French PCS (Professions et Catégories Socioprofessionnelles) occupational 
nomenclature. Intermediate professions mainly include teachers and technicians.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed z-tests).
table 2. (continued)
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in explaining residential mobility. Given the 
similarities in findings in Models 1, 2 and 3, 
and because Model 1 is the most simply 
designed, we consider it our preferred model 
and perform our robustness tests using it.
Differences across Groups?
Table 4’s first panel reports interaction effects 
for the share of immigrants and the share of 
co-ethnics with individual occupation (man-
agers, blue collar, and other); interactions 
with age are displayed in the second panel 
(younger than 55 years and older than 55). 
Each interaction effect is incorporated suc-
cessively into Model 1 (Table 3).
The proportion of immigrants has a uni-
formly nonsignificant effect across occupa-
tions, but a native flight effect is statistically 
perceivable for older natives. Indeed, some 
prior studies show that migration at retirement 
age is motivated by residential considerations 
(Détang-Dessendre et al. 2008). Our findings 
indicate that local ethnic characteristics are 
among these residential considerations. They 
also suggest that the effect of ethnic prefer-
ences on the decision to move is activated 
only when family or labor-related constraints 
are reduced.
Except for immigrant managers, the sig-
nificance and magnitude of the ethnic cluster-
ing effect are similar across groups. The 
nonsignificance of the ethnic clustering effect 
for manager immigrants may be interpreted in 
light of the literature on ethnic communities: 
immigrant managers do not need the ethnic 
group’s social capital, whereas the most dis-
advantaged immigrants may benefit from 
their ethnic group’s socioeconomic support 
and thus stay geographically close. These 
results may also be interpreted in terms of 
constraining mechanisms on mobility that 
operate most effectively for the most disad-
vantaged categories of immigrants. Finally, 
table 3. Influence of Local Ethnic Composition on the Probability of Moving in the Next 
Period, Controlling for Geographic Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
 Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Communes > 10,000 Inhabitants  
 Natives  
  Share of immigrants .040 .034 –.004 .046 .048 .048
 Immigrants  
  Share of immigrants .005 .040 .149 .138 –.007 .076
  Share of co-ethnics –.234*** .023 –.236*** .030 –.292*** .029
Communes < 10,000 Inhabitants  
 Natives  
  Share of immigrants .018 .022  
 Immigrants  
  Share of immigrants –.042 .038  
  Share of co-ethnics –.112*** .024  
Commune FE Yes Yes, interacted with 
immigrant dummy
Yes
Individual Heterogeneity No No Random Effects
Communes’ Sample All > 10,000 inhabitants > 10,000 inhabitants
N 583,266 287,844 288,442
Pseudo R-Sq .1 .05 .05
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed z-tests).
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we test for different effects across immigrant 
groups and we consistently find a nonsignifi-
cant white flight and a sizeable ethnic cluster-
ing effect in all regressions.
Geographic Definition of Residential 
Mobility
In the analyses presented earlier, the effect of 
municipalities’ ethnic composition is mea-
sured only for individual moves between 
municipalities. This definition of mobility is 
questionable because it does not distinguish 
between short- and long-distance moves 
(Long 1988; Long, Tucker, and Urton 1988). 
Local ethnic composition may affect only 
short-distance mobility, whereas long-distance 
moves are more likely to be influenced by life-
cycle events, work status, or work position.
In Table 5, we perform several analyses 
that test whether our findings are sensitive to 
the definition of geographic mobility. In the 
first two columns, mobility is still observed 
only if individuals change municipalities, but 
the distance between origin and destination 
municipalities is taken into account. The first 
column reports findings of an ordered probit 
model differentiating between four ordered 
mobility outcomes: “no mobility,” “less than 
10 km mobility,” “between 10 and 100 km 
mobility,” and “more than 100 km mobility.” 
The second column uses a tobit model in 
which the first equation models the propensity 
to move out of the municipality, and the sec-
ond equation models the distance between the 
origin and destination municipalities for the 
individual who moved. Identification of tobit 
models requires an exclusion variable that 
must be correlated with the first equation’s 
dependent variable and unrelated to the second 
one. We use homeownership as the exclusion 
variable; although it is negatively correlated 
with the probability of mobility, it will hardly 
affect the movement distance. In each of these 
models, geographic fixed effects are con-
trolled by introducing commune dummies 
(only for communes with more than 10,000 
inhabitants). Table 5 clearly shows that the 
native flight effect is uniformly nonsignificant 
no matter the definition of residential mobil-
ity. Nor does a municipality’s immigrant con-
centration affect distance between origin and 
destination municipalities.
It remains possible, however, that some 
native flight dynamics are at play at a smaller 
contextual scale, namely for moves within 
communes. Contexts within communes are 
unfortunately impossible to analyze with our 
data, but the French census includes a ques-
tion about individuals’ place of residence at 
table 4. Heterogeneity of Results across Subpopulations
Native Flight Effect
Ethnic Clustering 
Effect
Natives Immigrants Immigrants
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Model 1. Interaction Effects with 
Occupations
 
 Managers .017 .037 –.098 .091 .101 .119
 Blue Collar .045 .035 .028 .046 –.220*** .037
 Other Occupations .043 .034 .000 .042 –.231*** .029
Model 1. Interaction Effects with 
Age
 
 Younger than 55 Years .018 .034 .013 .041 –.240*** .025
 Older than 55 Years .205*** .036 –.007 .059 –.302*** .066
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed z-tests).
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the previous census date that allows us to 
detect within-commune moves. Prior analy-
ses rely on longitudinal tracking of individu-
als’ locations to identify geographic mobility, 
whereas here we use individuals’ declarations 
about place of residence on the former census 
date and thus infer within-commune mobility 
(for individuals who did not change their 
commune between censuses but reported a 
different place of residence at the former cen-
sus). In the last column of Table 5, we test for 
the effect of municipality ethnic composition 
on a threefold geographic mobility variable 
using a multinomial logit model: “no mobil-
ity” (the base outcome), “within commune 
mobility,” and “between commune mobility.” 
If native flight takes place within communes, 
one may expect natives’ within-commune 
moves to be more frequent in municipalities 
with greater proportions of immigrants. Table 
5 falsifies this hypothesis: natives’ within-
commune moves are not sensitive to the eth-
nic composition of their municipality of 
residence. Although this analysis cannot com-
pletely rule out the possibility of within-
commune native flight, it suggests this is not 
prominent.
On the other hand, all models in Table 5 
show that the ethnic clustering effect is very 
robust to changes in the definition of mobility. 
The presence of co-ethnics diminishes not 
only immigrants’ probability of moving out 
of their communes but also the distance that 
separates their origin and destination loca-
tions. The share of co-ethnics in one’s com-
mune is nonetheless positively correlated 
with immigrants’ within-commune mobility. 
Although we cannot further investigate this 
result with our data, this finding does not 
contradict the ethnic clustering effect we 
measure when between-commune moves are 
modeled. This suggests that immigrants’ 
within-commune moves tend to be frequent 
in communes where the share of their co-
ethnics is large, most likely because immi-
grants relocate even closer to their co-ethnics.
Ethnic Avoidance in Relocation 
Decisions
The white flight paradigm supposes that a 
neighborhood’s ethnic composition acts like a 
push factor for the white population’s mobil-
ity. However, when people have stable jobs, 
schools for their children, and social attach-
ments, it is questionable whether their prefer-
ences toward a neighborhood’s ethnic 
composition would push them to move out. 
Alternatively, natives’ unwillingness to live 
with ethnic minorities may be activated once 
table 5. Testing Different Definitions of Residential Mobility
Tobit Model Multinomial Logit
 
Ordered 
Probit
Moving  
Out Distance
Within 
Commune
Between 
Communes
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Natives  
 Share of  
 immigrants
.029 .022 .015 .024 .082 .050 .036 .063 .045 .049
Immigrants  
 Share of  
 immigrants
–.011 .025 –.007 .027 –.150* .059 –.022 .067 .023 .055
 Share of co- 
 ethnics
–.142*** .012 –.129*** .013 –.205*** .038 .092*** .034 –.227*** .036
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed z-tests).
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they decide to move (regardless of the rea-
son). Such preferences would thus be more 
likely to shape relocation choices rather than 
determine probability of geographic mobility 
(Ellen 2000; Quillian 2002; South and 
Crowder 1998). In that case, we should 
observe a very small or even nonsignificant 
ethnic composition effect on the probability 
of fleeing, whereas the same effect would be 
determinant upon relocating.
To test for a potential relocating effect, we 
ran an aggregate model11 that counts, for each 
commune, the number of natives and the 
number of immigrants entering the commune 
in 1990 and 1999. Because we have two time 
periods, it is possible to control for a geo-
graphic fixed effect at the municipality level 
(see Table 6). Controlling for other contextual 
variables, the effect of the local immigrant 
share on the number of natives settling in a 
commune is significant and sizeable. For each 
additional standard deviation in the share of 
immigrants, the number of natives entering a 
commune is reduced by 10 percent. Although 
nonsignificant, the share of the immigrant 
population has, conversely, a positive impact 
on the number of immigrants moving into a 
commune.12 These results suggest that the 
weak native flight effect initially measured 
while modeling out-migration is only part of 
the story; ethnic preferences seem to have a 
significant impact on movers’ location choice. 
Nonetheless, these findings suffer from their 
aggregated nature and do not lend themselves 
to interpretation in terms of individual choice.
DISCuSSIoN AND 
CoNCLuSIoNS
This article is one of the first to measure 
effects of local ethnic composition on native 
and immigrant geographic mobility in France. 
Our estimation strategy puts forward the 
value of panel data and modeling compared 
to simple cross-sectional estimations. The 
correlation between immigrant concentration 
in some areas and French natives moving out 
of these areas becomes less pronounced and 
even loses its significance when we control 
for geographic heterogeneity. Conversely, 
immigrants’ mobility (or more precisely their 
immobility) is highly associated with the 
presence of co-ethnics in their residential 
location. This ethnic clustering effect resists 
all variations in model specifications and its 
magnitude is considerable. All in all, only 
Hypothesis 2 is supported by our analyses.
What may explain the absence of French 
white flight? Does it reflect a greater degree 
of tolerance toward minority populations? 
This interpretation contradicts existing evi-
dence on prejudice and racism in French 
society. Anti-immigrant sentiments experi-
enced a steady rise during the period covered 
by our data. With the extreme right’s growing 
popularity since the 1980s, immigration has 
become a crucial political issue. At the same 
time, a new generation of immigrants’ 
descendants entered adulthood, marked by 
their experiences of racism and discrimina-
tion. The global climate covered by our data 
saw exacerbating intolerance toward minority 
populations.
Alternative explanations may draw on the 
relatively lower degree of ethnic segregation 
in France compared to the United States. 
Research links white flight dynamics to tip-
ping points; few municipalities in France 
have high proportions of minorities, so it is 
possible the tipping-point threshold has not 
yet been reached.
table 6. Moving into French Communes 
(Coefficients on the Standardized Share of 
Immigrants)
Natives Immigrants
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Moving In (log)  
 Less than  
 10,000 inh.
–.001 .011 –.021 .053
 More than  
 10,000 inh.
–.097* .047 .076 .059
N 34,833 4,823
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed z-
tests).
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On the other hand, the small and nonsig-
nificant effect of the share of immigrants on 
natives’ out-migration may stem from limita-
tions of our data and, specifically, categoriza-
tion issues. Unlike U.S. data, the French 
census only allows us to measure native flight, 
rather than white flight. The native category 
includes unidentified immigrant descendants 
whose share in the whole population is esti-
mated around 10 percent since the 1980s 
(Borrel and Lhommeau 2010; Tribalat 1997). 
If their geographic mobility more closely 
resembles first-generation immigrants’ pat-
terns rather than natives without immigrant 
ascendants, our estimate may be biased down-
ward, which may at least partly explain the 
nonsignificance of native flight in our models. 
Geographic categorization issues may also be 
at stake: because this study relies on data at 
the municipality level, we cannot dismiss the 
possibility that some native flight dynamics 
might be at play at a smaller contextual scale. 
Our analyses suggest otherwise, however, 
given that our findings are not sensitive to the 
definition of residential mobility.13
The absence of a French white flight effect 
provides support for more fundamental criti-
cism of the white flight literature. This litera-
ture supposes that individual preferences are 
the driving forces of residential mobility—
and consequently of segregation—and that 
measurement of a statistical association 
between local ethnic composition and the 
probability to move is an appropriate empiri-
cal assessment of this social fact. Our results 
show that although the white flight effect is 
perceptible in simple regression models, 
introduction of additional controls, specifi-
cally other observed and unobserved geo-
graphic characteristics, make it small and 
insignificant. These results put into perspec-
tive attempts to empirically detect white flight 
in quantitative data on individuals’ place of 
residence. In such data, the empirical proof of 
(personal) motivations underlying mobility is 
invariably at risk of being invalidated once 
additional controls are included.
Analyses of relocation lend themselves 
more appropriately to interpretations in terms 
of preferences. In our case, it seems that the 
ethnic composition of neighborhoods where 
people happen to move (whatever the reason) 
does matter: natives tend to relocate to com-
munes with a smaller proportion of immigrants. 
Nonetheless, investigating the effect of ethnic 
composition on relocation decisions requires 
data that track locational choice processes (e.g., 
all housing inquiries or visits). Data with spe-
cific information about neighborhood prefer-
ences may also be helpful. Finally, qualitative 
research on residential strategies is also valua-
ble in understanding individual preferences in 
terms of neighborhood ethnic composition.
What about the ethnic clustering pattern 
that consistently appears in our analyses? 
What may explain the strong and resistant 
negative effect of the proportion of co-ethnics 
on immigrants’ probability to move out? 
Some may argue that this finding is related to 
immigrants’ increasing ethnic retention and 
their willingness to separate from mainstream 
society. Here again, this contradicts empirical 
findings on the desirability of integration 
within the immigrant population and their 
relatively rapid cultural assimilation (Safi 
2008). Some research draws attention to 
mechanisms of solidarity that prompt ethnic 
groups to seek self-segregation to enhance 
ethnic social capital, especially in a context of 
widespread hostility and discrimination in the 
host society (Portes 1998). Glikman and 
Semyonov’s (2012) comparative study shows, 
for example, that although preferences for 
ethnic neighbors explain a considerable share 
of Asians’ concentration in European cities, 
perceived discrimination is a more influential 
factor underlying Muslim and African immi-
grants’ segregation. Musterd and Vos (2007) 
also find very little evidence that immigrant 
groups themselves consciously strengthen the 
ethnic identity of their residential areas. Pub-
lic debate tends to focus only on cultural fac-
tors of ethnic clustering (e.g., the search for 
religious homogeneity or the desire to main-
tain traditions and language), but academic 
literature also emphasizes the structural 
mechanisms at play (e.g., chain migration and 
ethnic networks, endogamous marriages and 
family relations, and ethnic businesses) (Fischer 
1975, 1984, 1995; Logan et al. 2002).
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Alternative explanations of the ethnic 
clustering pattern we observe may draw on 
the increasingly ethnicized structures of the 
French housing market. The period of obser-
vation in our data corresponds to important 
changes in immigrant occupancy of the pub-
lic housing sector. Initially inaccessible to 
them, immigrant families began to access the 
public housing stock in substantial numbers 
only since the 1980s. These families, who 
were increasingly replacing male guest work-
ers, often had no other housing options. The 
proportion of natives living in public housing 
units was stable over the period (around 14 
percent), but the proportion of immigrants 
increased from 24 percent in 1982 to 33 per-
cent in 1999 (Verdugo 2011). The rise was 
most notable for sub-Saharan Africans (25 
percent in 1982 versus 42 percent in 1999) 
(Fougère et al. 2013). Segregation of non-
European immigrants in public housing has 
increased to such an extent that only in such 
neighborhoods can one find substantially 
more immigrants than natives (Barou 2002).
Some qualitative studies suggest that subsi-
dized housing agencies practiced ethnoracial 
profiling of tenants, which may partly explain 
the increasing pattern of ethnic segregation 
within public housing (Tissot 2005). Ethnora-
cial assignment into public housing units may 
interact with specific socioeconomic con-
straints facing immigrant families. Middle-
class natives may be able to reject the first 
housing offer (partly motivated by a location’s 
ethnic composition), but immigrant families 
are more likely to be desperately in need of a 
place to live, and thus inclined to take the first 
offer even if it is in the least desirable neigh-
borhood. Finally, housing discrimination in the 
private market can also lead immigrants to be 
more inclined to stay in public housing units 
once obtained. This is all the more true given 
that, in some cases, legal residency status and 
the opportunity to bring family members to 
France through family reunion procedures are 
increasingly conditioned by housing criteria.
Our study puts into perspective the validity 
of the traditional opposition between patterns 
of ethnoracial urban inequality in the United 
States and in France (and Europe more gener-
ally). Of course, the magnitude of segregation 
is not the same across the Atlantic and it is 
important to keep in mind the historical speci-
ficity of the black ghetto. However, depiction 
of the French urban landscape as a highly 
heterogeneous universe in which racial or 
ethnic categories have little social potency 
(Wacquant 2008) is not supported by our 
empirical analysis. Local social characteristics 
and individuals’ socioeconomic status are not 
sufficient to explain patterns of natives’ and 
immigrants’ geographic mobility. Native flight 
dynamics are certainly minor, but ethnic pref-
erences still exert effects on natives’ reloca-
tion decisions. Moreover, the consistent 
pattern of ethnic clustering sheds light on 
some ethnically biased mechanisms of urban 
inequality that reinforce segmentation of the 
housing market in France. Our study suggests 
that, instead of exclusively focusing on indi-
vidual explanations related to preferences and 
ethnoracial prejudice, research on residential 
mobility should be more attentive to structural 
explanations and seek appropriate data and 
methods to empirically investigate them. In 
France, research needs to draw on longitudinal 
data tracking residential mobility into and out 
of public housing units. Additional research is 
still needed on the settlement dynamics of 
recent waves of migrants as one major struc-
tural factor that may lead to increasing ethnic 
clustering in the urban landscape.
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Notes
 1. The French republican model refuses to recognize 
any ethnic or racial differentiation in French soci-
ety. It rejects ethnicity, culture, and religion as bases 
for political organization, claims-making, and even, 
historically, categories for official statistics (Simon 
1998, 2010).
 2. Ethnicity per se is not reported in any French public 
statistics survey. Only migration status (immigrant 
or native) can be found in census data. In this arti-
cle, ethnicity refers more specifically to first-gener-
ation immigrants’ country of birth.
 3. Recent research has used experimental methods to 
assess racial or ethnic preferences in neighborhood 
choice net of other social factors (Emerson, Chai, 
and Yancey 2001; Krysan et al. 2009). These studies 
tend to show that whites’ neighborhood preferences 
are not racially blind.
 4. The comparison of French and U.S. indices suffers 
from many limitations related to geographic units 
and population definitions. In France, recently pub-
lished indices use a geographic scale that is still 
too big in comparison with census tracts used in 
the United States. Moreover, indices are computed 
for ethnic groups in the United States, whereas they 
are obtained only for first-generation immigrants in 
France because no data are available on ethnicity. If 
French statistics on segregation included at least the 
second generation (which is almost as large as the 
first generation), the indices might be considerably 
greater (Rathelot 2012).
 5. For more information, see the INSEE webpage 
about the EDP (http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/
default.asp?page=sources/ope-adm-echantillon-
edp.htm).
 6. Communes represent the smallest administrative 
geographic subdivision and are governed by may-
ors. In big cities (Paris, Marseille, Lyon) we use the 
arrondissement rather than the commune because it 
is the smallest administrative unit available there. In 
this article, the term municipality is interchangeable 
with the French term commune.
 7. IRIS (an acronym of “aggregated units for statisti-
cal information”; they contain between 1,800 and 
5,000 inhabitants) are much more comparable to 
U.S. census tracts than are municipalities. INSEE 
(the French National Statistical Office) introduced 
this territorial division for dissemination of the 
1999 population census. Unfortunately, it is only 
available since 1999.
 8. Using a natural experiment design, data in Sweden 
and Denmark (Damm 2009; Edin, Fredriksson, and 
Aslund 2003) show that immigrants’ initial location 
decisions are highly determined by the presence of 
their co-ethnics and that the proportion of co-eth-
nics in relocation neighborhoods has a lasting effect 
on subsequent mobility.
 9. All contextual variables (except log of total popula-
tion) are proportions (between 0 and 1). Therefore, 
the odds ratio should be interpreted as the impact of 
a variation from 0 to 1 (and not the increase of one 
percentage point). We computed variance inflation 
factors (VIF) to detect multicollinearity between con-
textual variables. All VIF are lower than three.
10. We discuss results using random and fixed individ-
ual effects in the online supplement.
11. Unlike geographic mobility, location choice is very 
difficult to model with individual data. Ioannides and 
Zabel (2008), for example, used multinomial models, 
but their framework relies on strong microeconomic 
hypotheses. In addition, models of destination choice 
suffer from potentially considerable selection bias.
12. Note that the co-ethnic effect remains very difficult 
to measure within these aggregate models of mov-
ing out of and into French municipalities; it would 
necessitate reiterating the estimation for each ethnic 
group. Given that ethnic groups’ subsamples are not 
sizeable enough, we would have a lot of municipali-
ties with very few immigrant arrivals from a spe-
cific ethnic group and measurement errors would 
become very problematic.
13. We nevertheless acknowledge that all our definitions 
of residential mobility are based on a spatial con-
ception of the urban landscape in which geographic 
distance is the primary reference. This framework 
ignores other patterns of segregation that have more 
to do with a city’s urban structure, neighborhoods’ 
connections, and the degree to which residential 
streets communicate. This urban infrastructure may 
have more of an effect than geographic distance on 
determining social interactions (Grannis 1998).
References
Alba, Richard D., John R. Logan, Brian J. Stults, Gil-
bert Marzan, and Wenquan Zhang. 1999. “Immigrant 
Groups in the Suburbs: A Reexamination of Subur-
banization and Spatial Assimilation.” American Soci-
ological Review 64:446–60.
Aldrich, Howard E. and Roger Waldinger. 1990. “Ethnic-
ity and Entrepreneurship.” Annual Review of Sociol-
ogy 16:111–35.
Barou, Jacques. 2002. L’Habitat des Immigrés et de leurs 
Familles. Paris: La Documentation Française.
Bobo, Lawrence and Camille L. Zubrinsky. 1996. “Atti-
tudes on Residential Integration: Perceived Status 
Differences, Mere In-Group Preference, or Racial 
Prejudice?” Social Forces 74:883–909.
Bonnet, François, Etienne Lalé, Mirna Safi, and Etienne 
Wasmer. 2011. “A la Recherche du Locataire “Idéal”: 
du Droit aux Pratiques en Région Parisienne.” 
Regards Croisés sur L’Economie 9:216–27.
Borjas, George J. 1992. “Ethnic Capital and Intergen-
erational Mobility.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
107:123–50.
Borrel, Catherine and Bertrand Lhommeau. 2010. “Etre 
Né en France d’un Parent Immigré.” Insee Première 
n°1287, Insee.
 
62  American Sociological Review 79(1)
Boustan, Leah Platt. 2010. “Was Postwar Suburbaniza-
tion ‘White Flight’? Evidence from the Black Migra-
tion.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125:417–43.
Brandolini, Andrea and Timothy M. Smeeding. 2006. 
“Patterns of Economic Inequality in Western Democ-
racies: Some Facts on Levels and Trends.” PS: Politi-
cal Science and Politics 39:21–26.
Card, David and John DiNardo. 2000. “Do Immigrant 
Inflows Lead to Native Outflows?” American Eco-
nomic Review 90:360–67.
Card, David, Alexandre Mas, and Jesse Rothstein. 2008. 
“Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 123:177–218.
Charles, Camille Zubrinsky. 2003. “The Dynamics of 
Racial Residential Segregation.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 29:167–207.
Clark, William A. V. 1991. “Residential Preferences 
and Neighborhood Racial Segregation: A Test of the 
Schelling Segregation Model.” Demography 28:1–19.
Courgeau, Daniel. 1982. “Comparaison des Migrations 
Internes en France et aux Etats-Unis.” Population 
37:1184–88.
Damm, Anna Piil. 2009. “Determinants of Recent Immi-
grants’ Location Choices: Quasi-Experimental Evi-
dence.” Journal of Population Economics 22:145–74.
Dawkins, Casey J. 2004. “Recent Evidence on the Con-
tinuing Causes of Black-White Residential Segrega-
tion.” Journal of Urban Affairs 26:379–400.
Détang-Dessendre, Cécile, Florence Goffette-Nagot, and 
Virginie Piguet. 2008. “Life Cycle and Migration to 
Urban and Rural Areas: Estimation of a Mixed Logit 
Model on French Data.” Journal of Regional Science 
48:789–824.
Duncan, Otis Dudley and Stanley Lieberson. 1959. “Eth-
nic Segregation and Assimilation.” American Journal 
of Sociology 64:364–74.
Edin, Per-Anders, Peter Fredriksson, and Olof Aslund. 
2003. “Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of 
Immigrants: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118:329–57.
Ellen, Ingrid Gould. 2000. Sharing America’s Neighbor-
hood. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Emerson, Michael O., Karen J. Chai, and George Yancey. 
2001. “Does Race Matter in Residential Segregation? 
Exploring the Preferences of White Americans.” 
American Sociological Review 66:922–35.
Fairlie, Robert W. and Alexandra M. Resch. 2002. “Is 
There White Flight Into Private Schools? Evidence 
from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey.” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 84:21–33.
Farley, Reynolds, Howard Schuman, Suzanne Bianchi, 
Diane Colasanto, and Shirley Hatchett. 1978. “Choc-
olate City, Vanilla Suburbs: Will the Trend Toward 
Racially Separate Communities Continue?” Social 
Science Research 7:319–44.
Farley, Reynolds, Charlotte Steeh, Maria Krysan, Tara 
Jackson, and Keith Reeves. 1994. “Stereotypes and 
Segregation: Neighborhoods in the Detroit Area.” 
American Journal of Sociology 100:750–80.
Fischer, Claude S. 1975. “Toward a Subcultural The-
ory of Urbanism.” American Journal of Sociology 
80:1319–41.
Fischer, Claude S. 1984. The Urban Experience, 2nd ed. 
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Fischer, Claude S. 1995. “The Subcultural Theory of 
Urbanism: A Twentieth-Year Assessment.” American 
Journal of Sociology 101:543–77.
Fix, Michael and Raymond Jay Struyk. 1993. Clear and 
Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination 
in America. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
Fougère, Denis, Francis Kramarz, Roland Rathelot, and 
Mirna Safi. 2013. “Social Housing and Location 
Choices of Immigrants in France.” International 
Journal of Manpower 34:56–69.
Frey, William H. 1979. “Central City White Flight: 
Racial and Nonracial Causes.” American Sociologi-
cal Review 44:425–48.
Frey, William H. 1995. “Immigration and Internal Migra-
tion ‘Flight’ from U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Toward 
a New Demographic Balkanisation.” Urban Studies 
32:733–57.
Gallot, Philippe, Elodie Leprévost, and Catherine Roug-
erie. 2011. “Prix des Logements Anciens et Loyers 
entre 2000 et 2010.” Insee Première n°1350, Insee.
Galster, George. 1988. “Residential Segregation in 
American Cities: A Contrary Review.” Population 
Research and Policy Review 7:93–112.
Galster, George. 1990. “White Flight from Racially Inte-
grated Neighborhoods in the 1970s: The Cleveland 
Experience.” Urban Studies 27:385–99.
Galster, George. 1992. “Research on Discrimination in 
Housing and Mortgage Markets: Assessment and 
Future Directions.” Housing Policy Debate 3:637–83.
Garbaye, Romain 2005. Getting Into Local Power: The 
Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French 
Cities. Oxford: Blackwell.
Girard, Alain. 1971. “Attitudes des Français à l’Egard de 
l’Immigration Etrangère: Enquête d’Opinion Pub-
lique.” Population 26:827–76.
Glikman, Anya and Moshe Semyonov. 2012. “Ethnic 
Origin and Residential Attainment of Immigrants in 
European Countries.” City & Community 11:198–219.
Grannis, Rick. 1998. “The Importance of Trivial Streets: 
Residential Streets and Residential Segregation.” 
American Journal of Sociology 103:1530–64.
Guyon, Nina. 2012. “Residential Income Segregation: 
Empirical Evidence From France.” Working Paper, 
Sciences Po, Department of Economics, Paris, France.
Halaby, Charles N. 2004. “Panel Models in Sociological 
Research.” Annual Review of Sociology 30:507–544.
Hauser, Robert M. 1974. “Contextual Analysis Revis-
ited.” Sociological Methods & Research 2:365–75.
Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour 
l’Egalité (HALDE). 2006, Mai. “La Discrimination 
dans l’Accès au Logement Locatif Privé.” ASDO études.
Iceland, John and Melissa Scopilliti. 2008. “Immigrant 
Residential Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 
1990–2000.” Demography 45:79–94.
 
Rathelot and Safi 63
Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. and Benjamin Scafidi. 2002. “Black 
Self-Segregation as a Cause of Housing Segrega-
tion: Evidence from the Multi-City Study of Urban 
Inequality.” Journal of Urban Economics 51:366–90.
Ioannides, Yannis M. and Jeffrey E. Zabel. 2008. “Inter-
actions, Neighborhood Selection and Housing 
Demand.” Journal of Urban Economics 63:229–52.
Kritz, Mary M. and Douglas T. Gurak. 2001. “The Impact 
of Immigration on the Internal Migration of Natives 
and Immigrants.” Demography 38:133–45.
Krivo, Lauren J. and Robert L. Kaufman. 2004. “Hous-
ing and Wealth Inequality: Racial-Ethnic Differences 
in Home Equity in the United States.” Demography 
41:585–605.
Krysan, Maria. 2002. “Whites Who Say They’d Flee: 
Who Are They, and Why Would They Leave?” 
Demography 39:675–96.
Krysan, Maria, Mick P. Couper, Reynolds Farley, and 
Tyrone A. Forman. 2009. “Does Race Matter in Neigh-
borhood Preferences? Results from a Video Experi-
ment.” American Journal of Sociology 115:527–59.
Krysan, Maria and Reynolds Farley. 2002. “The Residen-
tial Preferences of Blacks: Do They Explain Persis-
tent Segregation?” Social Forces 80:937–80.
Lamy, Marie-Laurence, Yves Charbit, and Alain 
Girard. 1974. “Attitudes des Français à l’Egard 
de l’Immigration Etrangère: Nouvelle Enquête 
d’Opinion.” Population 29:1015–69.
Light, Ivan H. 2006. Deflecting Immigration: Networks, 
Markets, and Regulation in Los Angeles. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation
Logan, John R., Richard D. Alba, and Wenquan Zhang. 
2002. “Immigrant Enclaves and Ethnic Communities 
in New York and Los Angeles.” American Sociologi-
cal Review 67:299–322.
Long, Larry H. 1988. Migration and Residential Mobility in 
the United States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Long, Larry H., C. Jack Tucker, and William L. Urton. 
1988. “Migration Distances: An International Com-
parison.” Demography 25:633–40.
Mairesse, Jacques and Nathalie Greenan. 1999. “Using 
Employee Level Data in a Firm Level Econometric 
Study.” Pp. 489–514 in The Creation and Analysis of 
Employer-Employee Matched Data, edited by J. C. 
Haltiwanger, J. I. Lane, J. R. Spletzer, J. J. M. Theeuwes, 
and K. R. Troske. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.
Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj, Jakob Munch, Sanne Schroll, 
and Jan Skaksen. 2009. “Explaining Cross-Country 
Differences in Attitudes towards Immigration in the 
EU-15.” Social Indicators Research 91:371–90.
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. 1985. “Spatial 
Assimilation as a Socioeconomic Outcome.” Ameri-
can Sociological Review 50:94–106.
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. 1988. “The 
Dimensions of Residential Segregation.” Social 
Forces 67:281–315.
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. American 
Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Under-
class. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Massey, Douglas S., Andrew B. Gross, and Kumiko 
Shibuya. 1994. “Migration, Segregation, and the 
Geographic Concentration of Poverty.” American 
Sociological Review 59:425–45.
Mayer, Nonna. 2002. “Les hauts et les bas du vote Le Pen 
2002.” Revue française de science politique 52:505–520.
Moulton, Brent R. 1990. “An Illustration of a Pitfall in 
Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Variables on Micro 
Units.” Review of Economics and Statistics 72:334–38.
Munshi, Kaivan. 2003. “Networks in the Modern Econ-
omy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor Market.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118:549–99.
Musterd, Sako and Sjoerd De Vos. 2007. “Residential 
Dynamics in Ethnic Concentrations.” Housing Stud-
ies 22:333–53.
Oberti, Marco. 2007. L’école dans la Ville: Ségrégation, 
Mixité, Carte Scolaire. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD). 2010. PISA 2009 Results: Over-
coming Social Background – Equity in Learning 
Opportunities and Outcomes, Vol. II (http://dx.doi 
.org/10.1787/9789264091504-en).
Oliver, Melvin L. and Thomas M. Shapiro. 1995. Black 
Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial 
Inequality. New York: Routledge.
Pais, Jeremy F., Scott J. South, and Kyle Crowder. 2009. 
“White Flight Revisited: A Multiethnic Perspec-
tive on Neighborhood Out-Migration.” Population 
Research & Policy Review 28:321–46.
Pan Ké Shon, Jean-Louis. 2009. “Ségrégation Ethnique 
et Ségrégation Sociale en Quartiers Sensibles.” Revue 
Française de Sociologie 50:451–87.
Park, Robert E. and Ernest W. Burgess. 1921. Introduc-
tion to the Science of Sociology. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Peach, Ceri. 1996. “Does Britain Have Ghettos?” Geo-
graphical Journal 11:216–35.
Peach, Ceri. 1999. “London and New York: Contrasts in 
British and American Models of Segregation.” Inter-
national Journal of Population Geography 5:319–47.
Portes, Alejandro. 1998. “Social Capital: Its Origins and 
Applications in Modern Sociology.” Annual Review 
of Sociology 24:1–24.
Préteceille, Edmond. 2009. “La Ségrégation Ethno-raciale 
a-t-elle Augmenté dans la Métropole Parisienne?” 
Revue Française de Sociologie 50:489–519.
Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. “Prejudice as a Response to Per-
ceived Group Threat: Population Composition and 
Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe.” 
American Sociological Review 60:586–611.
Quillian, Lincoln. 2002. “Why Is Black-White Residential Seg-
regation So Persistent? Evidence on Three Theories from 
Migration Data.” Social Science Research 31:197–229.
Rathelot, Roland. 2012. “Measuring Segregation When 
Units Are Small: A Parametric Approach.” Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics 30:546–53.
Renzulli, Linda A. and Lorraine Evans. 2005. “School 
Choice, Charter Schools, and White Flight.” Social 
Problems 52:398–418.
 
64  American Sociological Review 79(1)
Rhein, Catherine. 1998. “Globalisation, Social Change 
and Minorities in Metropolitan Paris: The Emergence 
of New Class Patterns.” Urban Studies 35:429–47.
Robinson, William S. 1950. “Ecological Correlations and 
the Behavior of Individuals.” American Sociological 
Review 15:351–57.
Safi, Mirna. 2008. “The Immigrant Integration Process in 
France: Inequalities and Segmentation.” Revue Fran-
çaise de Sociologie, English Issue 49:3–44.
Safi, Mirna. 2009. “La dimension spatiale de l’intégration: 
évolution de la ségrégation des populations immi-
grées en France entre 1968 et 1999.” Revue Française 
de Sociologie 50:521–52.
Safi, Mirna and Patrick Simon. Forthcoming. “La mesure 
des discriminations ethniques et raciales: représenta-
tions, expériences subjectives et situations vécues.” 
Economie et Statistique.
Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Thomas 
Gannon-Rowley. 2002. “Assessing ‘Neighborhood 
Effects’: Social Processes and New Directions in 
Research.” Annual Review of Sociology 28:443–78.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1969. “Models of Segregation.” 
American Economic Review 59:488–93.
Semyonov, Moshe, Anya Glikman, and Maria Krysan. 2007. 
“Europeans’ Preference for Ethnic Residential Homoge-
neity: Cross-National Analysis of Response to Neighbor-
hood Ethnic Composition.” Social Problems 54:434–53.
Semyonov, Moshe, Anastasia Gorodzeisky, and Anya 
Glikman. 2012. “Neighborhood Ethnic Composi-
tion and Resident Perceptions of Safety in European 
Countries.” Social Problems 59:117–35.
Semyonov, Moshe, Rebeca Raijman, and Anastasia 
Gorodzeisky. 2006. “The Rise of Anti-Foreigner Sen-
timent in European Societies, 1988–2000.” American 
Sociological Review 71:426–49.
Simon, Patrick. 1998. “Nationalité et Origine dans la 
Statistique Française.” Population 53:541–67.
Simon, Patrick. 2010. “Statistics, French Social Sciences 
and Ethnic and Race Relations.” Revue Française de 
Sociologie, English Issue 51:159–74.
South, Scott J. and Kyle D. Crowder. 1998. “Leaving the 
‘Hood’: Residential Mobility between Black, White, 
and Integrated Neighborhoods.” American Sociologi-
cal Review 63:17–26.
South, Scott J., Kyle Crowder, and Erick Chavez. 2005. 
“Migration and Spatial Assimilation among U.S. 
Latinos: Classical versus Segmented Trajectories.” 
Demography 42:497–521.
Tissot, Sylvie. 2005. “Une Discrimination Informelle? 
Usage du Concept de Mixité Sociale dans la Ges-
tion des Opérations de Logement HLM.” Actes de la 
Recherche en Sciences Sociales 159:54–69.
Tribalat, Michèle. 1997. “Chronique de l’Immigration: 
Les Populations d’Origine Etrangère en France Mét-
ropolitaine.” Population 52:163–219.
van Zanten, Agnès. 2001. L’Ecole de la Périphérie: Sco-
larité et Ségrégation en Banlieue. Paris: Puf.
Verdugo, Gregory. 2011. “Public Housing and Resi-
dential Segregation of Immigrants in France, 1968–
1999.” Population 66:169–94.
Vigdor, Jacob L. 2003. “Residential Segregation and 
Preference Misalignment.” Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics 54:587–609.
Wacquant, Loïc. 1992. “Banlieues Françaises et Ghetto 
Noir Américain: de l’Amalgame à la Comparaison.” 
French Politics, Culture & Society 10:81–103.
Wacquant, Loïc. 2008. Urban Outcasts: A Comparative 
Sociology of Advanced Marginality. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press.
White, Michael J. and Zai Liang. 1998. “The Effect of 
Immigration on the Internal Migration of the Native-
Born Population, 1981–1990.” Population Research 
& Policy Review 17:141–66.
Yinger, John. 1976. “Racial Prejudice and Racial Resi-
dential Segregation in an Urban Model.” Journal of 
Urban Economics 3:383–96.
Zavodny, Madeline. 1999. “Determinants of Recent 
Immigrants’ Locational Choices.” International 
Migration Review 33:1014–30.
Zhou, Min. 1992. Chinatown: The Socioeconomic Poten-
tial of an Urban Enclave. Philadelphia: Temple Uni-
versity Press.
 
Roland Rathelot is a Research Associate in the 
Department of Economics at CREST, Paris. He is also an 
Affiliate of the Centre for Research and Analysis of 
Migration. He obtained his PhD in 2010 from the Paris 
School of Economics, after working for six years as an 
Economist and Statistician for the French government. 
His current research focuses on the analysis of labor 
markets, with particular emphasis on residential segrega-
tion and diverse forms of local externalities. His work 
has recently appeared in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, the Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics, and Regional Science & Urban Economics.
Mirna Safi is a Research Professor in the Department of 
Sociology at Sciences Po, Faculty Affiliate at the 
Observatoire Sociologique du Changement (OSC). She is 
also a member of the Centre de Recherche en Economie 
et Statistique (CREST). She obtained her PhD in sociol-
ogy in 2007 at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences 
Sociales (EHESS). Safi predominantly works on immi-
gration, assimilation, spatial segregation, and ethnic and 
racial inequality. Her current research projects include 
immigrants’ housing in France, locational choices and 
neighborhood composition, and the implementation of 
diversity policies in French firms.
